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WORKING WITHOUT CHEVRON:
THE PTO AS PRIME MOVER
JOHN M. GOLDEN†
ABSTRACT
Through a proliferation of post-issuance administrative
proceedings, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has
become a major player in the fate of patents after their initial
examination and grant. In combination with the PTO’s more
traditional roles in initial examination and general guidance, new
post-issuance proceedings enable the PTO to help steer the
development of substantive patent law even without general provision
of high-level Chevron deference for the agency’s interpretations of
substantive aspects of the U.S. Patent Act. Contrary to some
commentators’ suggestions, congressional authorization for new postissuance proceedings does not appear to have included an implicit
delegation of interpretive authority generally warranting Chevron
deference on such matters. But the PTO can still accomplish much
with lower-level deference and the advantages that its common “first
mover” position provides.
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INTRODUCTION
From a relatively modest Jacksonian agency with limited
responsibilities after the initial examination and granting of patent
1
applications, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has
emerged as an adjudicatory forum that competes with courts in
2
reviewing the validity of original patent grants. Through a
proliferation of post-issuance proceedings, the constitution of a new
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) to preside over such
proceedings, and new statutory provisions on these proceedings and
3
their interactions with district court proceedings, the agency has
obtained an expanded capacity to have both the first and last word on
4
important questions of patentability and patent validity. These
capacities include the PTO’s controversial ability to effectively void
outstanding district court judgments by canceling previously issued

1. John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism,
and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071, 1134 (2000) (noting that, under
the 1836 Patent Act, “the Patent Office was given no power to issue substantive regulations—a
limitation that continues to have significant legal implications”).
2. See Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 610, 631 (2012) (“Supported by
financial reforms, the America Invents Act drastically expands the USPTO’s set of tools for
reviewing the validity of patents.”).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 49–52 and 210–17.
4. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for its Money: Challenging
Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 276 (2015).
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5

patent claims. Nonetheless, Article III courts have so far retained
their traditional roles as the primary fora for patent-infringement
disputes and as the primary expositors of substantive patent law. In
particular, courts have not yet recognized a general basis for
according high-level Chevron deference to the PTO’s interpretations
6
of substantive provisions of the U.S. Patent Act. The PTO’s status in
this regard renders it a relatively weak administrative agency by
modern standards, having less responsibility for determining the
7
meaning of its organic statute than many other federal agencies.
Further, this status apparently persists despite recent legal
developments. Contrary to recent arguments by some commentators,
this Article contends that recent additions to the Patent Act are
unlikely to change courts’ perception of the level of PTO interpretive
authority. But through new post-issuance proceedings, the PTO might
have a greater entitlement to lower-level Skidmore deference, a form
of deference under which courts are to accord positive weight to an
agency’s interpretation in accordance with factors such as the quality

5. See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(holding that cancellation of asserted patent claims in USPTO reexamination eliminated the
patentee’s cause of action in an infringement suit that “remain[ed] pending” on appeal despite
the fact that the district court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had already
upheld the asserted claims against challenges of invalidity); id. at 1347 (Newman, J., dissenting)
(contending that the Federal Circuit majority’s holding enables the USPTO “to override and
void the final judgment of a federal Article III Court of Appeals” and thereby “violates the
constitutional plan”); see also Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 733 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (en banc) (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (contending that, where no court “could disturb
[the patentee’s adjudicated] entitlement to damages for infringement,” “[u]nder no reasonable
application of the law . . . could the PTO’s actions eradicate that judgment”); Shashank
Upadhye & Adam Sussman, A Real Separation of Powers or Separation of Law: Can an Article I
Administrative Agency Nullify an Article III Federal Court Judgment?, 25 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 17 (2014) (noting the “tone of offense . . . in the Fresenius dissent”
at “the concept that . . . when the PTO nullified the patent, the PTO said the court should do so
too”).
6. See, e.g., Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 869 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting the Federal
Circuit’s position “that the [PTO’s] Board [of Patent Appeals and Interferences] does not earn
Chevron deference on questions of substantive patent law”); Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d
1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that the PTO Commissioner’s “Final Determination” of a
question of statutory interpretation was not eligible for Chevron deference “[b]ecause Congress
has not vested the Commissioner with any general substantive rulemaking power”).
7. John M. Golden, The USPTO’s Soft Power: Who Needs Chevron Deference?, 66 SMU
L. REV. 541, 541–42 (2013) [hereinafter Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power] (noting that, unlike
many federal administrative agencies, the PTO lacks a recognized entitlement to “high-level
[Chevron] deference for its interpretation of substantive aspects of the Patent Act”).
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of the agency’s deliberations and reasoning. The PTO can and should
exploit such deference and its common “first mover” advantage to
help steer the development of patent law’s substance and process
9
toward a more stable and pragmatically balanced future.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the PTO’s
growth and the PTAB’s nature and early impacts. Part II highlights
limitations on PTO authority, particularly the PTO’s apparently
continuing absence of a general grant of Chevron-level interpretive
authority on questions of substantive patent law. In this vein, Part II
counters other commentators’ contentions that new statutory
provisions for PTO proceedings in the 2011 Leahy-Smith America
10
Invents Act (AIA) mean that, when issued through new postissuance proceedings, PTAB decisions on the meaning of substantive
provisions of the Patent Act have a general entitlement to Chevron
deference. Part III points out that, even without a new claim to
Chevron deference, the PTO can benefit from a stronger claim to
Skidmore deference. The PTO can use Skidmore deference and its
first-mover advantages to contribute substantially to the development
of patent law. The Conclusion suggests that the PTO’s diligent use of
such existing capacities might be more fruitful than efforts to expand
the PTO’s interpretive authority.
I. NOT THE 1970S’ PTO
The past four decades have featured dramatic institutional
developments in U.S. patent law. The Article III judiciary has starred
in a number of these, including, (1) the emergence of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as the primary, day-to-day judicial
11
expositor of patent law; (2) the U.S. Supreme Court’s temporary
8. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (describing factors that give an
agency’s judgment “power to persuade”); see also Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power, supra note 7,
at 548–49 (discussing Skidmore deference).
9. Cf. Sarah Tran, Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 495
(2012) (contending that “giving the USPTO more opportunities to engage in policymaking
could enable the USPTO to produce economies of scale for the patent system and help create
better tailored innovation policy”).
10. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) [hereinafter AIA].
11. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal
Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 788–89 (2008) (discussing the Federal
Circuit’s performance during its first quarter century); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal
Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989) (examining the
Federal Circuit’s performance during the first several years of its existence).
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withdrawal from and subsequent return to being a regular active
12
player in substantive patent law; and (3) the rise of jurisdictions,
such as the Eastern District of Texas and District of Delaware, as
13
favorite fora for patent disputes. The PTO’s growth into an agency
14
with a multibillion-dollar annual budget, over ten thousand
15
16
employees, and a raft of post-issuance proceedings has been
similarly remarkable, however, and might presage a significant
17
rebalancing of power between the PTO and Article III courts.
The PTAB appears likely to be at the center of any immediate
rebalancing of power between the PTO and the courts. The PTAB’s
central position in this regard stems, in part, from the sheer volume of
work that it has assumed as successor to the PTO’s prior internal
adjudicatory board, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
18
(BPAI). But the PTAB’s prominence reflects two additional factors.

12. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the
Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 283 (noting that, starting in “the mid-1990s,” the
Supreme “Court began exercising its certiorari power more frequently in Federal Circuit patent
cases”); John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 658 (2009) [hereinafter
Golden, Prime Percolator] (observing that “the Supreme Court ha[d], in the past six years,
asserted its dominion over patent law with frequency and force”); Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in
the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 387 (“The Supreme Court has
rendered itself well nigh invisible in modern substantive patent law.”).
13. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
631, 631 (2015) (“There are ninety-four federal district courts in the United States, but nearly
half of the six thousand patent cases filed in 2013 were filed in just two of those courts: the
District of Delaware and the Eastern District of Texas.”); Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly,
Forum Selling, 32 (USC CLASS Research Paper No. 14-35; USC Law Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 14-44, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538857 [https://perma.cc/TJ8TJW3Q] (observing that “Delaware is the only district that approaches east Texas in its share of
patent litigation and the only other district whose share has increased significantly in recent
years”); Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in United States District Courts: 1994 to 2014, 101 IOWA L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 39), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2570803 [http://perma.cc/
YV4Z-VYBS] (commenting that “[t]he Eastern District of Texas has gone to great lengths to
bend almost every procedural aspect of patent litigation in favor of plaintiffs” and that “[t]he
District of Delaware has gone down the same path, but not quite as far”).
14. Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power, supra note 7, at 541 (reporting that, in fiscal year 2012,
the USPTO “had about $2.3 billion in program costs”).
15. Id. (reporting that, in fiscal year 2012, “the USPTO employed over 11,000 people,
including nearly 8,000 patent examiners”).
16. Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 881 (2015) (chronicling
the emergence of multiple mechanisms “for post-issuance review of U.S. patents” since 1980).
17. Tran, supra note 2, at 613 (contending that “a number of the USPTO’s new powers
conflict irreconcilably with the Federal Circuit’s traditional view of USPTO authority”).
18. Michael Wagner, An Introduction to Administrative Patent Judges at the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board, 62 FED. LAW. 36, 36 (May 2015).
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First, there is the eye-catching nature of its initial, relatively antipatentee, rounds of decisionmaking, which caught the attention of the
patent community. Second, there is the possibility that at least an
important subset of PTAB decisions on questions of law will receive
significant deference from the courts. As discussed in Part III, such
deference could result, for example, when the PTAB has interpreted
PTO regulations. Further, even if Part II is correct in contending that
courts are unlikely to recognize a general entitlement to Chevron
deference for PTAB interpretations of substantive provisions of the
Patent Act, significant deference toward these PTAB interpretations
could result from the application of Skidmore deference in light of the
19
relatively formal nature of inter partes PTAB proceedings, which are
“inter partes” in the sense that they enable the continuous
involvement of an opposing private party who actively contests a
20
patentee’s contentions of patentability.
This Part proceeds by (1) providing a primer on the PTO and the
PTAB, (2) discussing the PTAB’s growth and impressive caseload,
and (3) discussing some of the early results of PTAB decisionmaking.
A. Primer on the PTO and the PTAB
21

The PTO is a division of the Department of Commerce that has
two basic statutory responsibilities: (1) “the granting and issuing of
patents and the registration of trademarks” and (2) ”disseminating to
22
the public information with respect to patents and trademarks.” By
statute, the PTO has independent “responsibility for decisions
regarding [its] management and administration” but is “subject to the
23
policy direction of the Secretary of Commerce.” The Patent Act
vests the PTO’s “powers and duties . . . in an Under Secretary of
Commerce for Intellectual Property” who bears the title of PTO
Director and is “responsible for providing policy direction and

19. See infra text accompanying notes 180–82.
20. See Tran, supra note 2, at 631 (describing post-grant review as “provid[ing] third parties
with an opportunity to challenge the validity of claims in a recently-issued patent on any ground
relating to the statutory requirements of patentability”); id. at 633 (“After a post-grant review
terminates or the window in which such a review could have been instituted passes, third parties
may petition for inter partes review . . . .”).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2012) (“The United States Patent and Trademark Office is
established as an agency of the United States, within the Department of Commerce.”).
22. Id. § 2(a).
23. Id. § 1(a).
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24

management supervision for the Office.” The President appoints the
25
Director “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Power
26
to remove the Director is also vested in the President.
The PTAB is a body of administrative judges within the PTO
that handles a variety of PTO appeal-and-review proceedings. By
statute, the PTAB’s membership consists of the PTO’s Director and
Deputy Director, the Commissioners for Patents and for Trademarks,
27
and administrative patent judges. Under the Patent Act, the
Secretary of Commerce appoints the Deputy Director “upon
28
nomination by the Director,” appoints the Commissioners without a
29
statutory requirement of Director nomination, and appoints the
30
administrative patent judges “in consultation with the Director.”
The Director has the power to “fix the rate of basic pay for the
31
administrative patent judges.” The Patent Act requires that PTAB
judges sit to hear proceedings in panels of “at least 3 members . . .
32
designated by the Director.” In a case decided specifically with
respect to the BPAI but with reasoning that apparently extends to the
PTAB, the Federal Circuit held that, although the Board is no mere
alter ego of the Director and the head of the PTO “may not control
the way any individual member of [a] panel votes,” the head of the
PTO may designate a panel to rehear a case and, at least as far as the
Patent Act (as understood by the Federal Circuit) is concerned, may
“convene [a] panel which he knows or hopes will render the decision
33
he desires.” Because the neutrality of a panel selected to produce a
34
particular result might be questioned, constitutional constraints of
24. Id. § 3(a).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 3(a)(4) (“The Director may be removed from office by the President.”).
27. Id. § 6(a) (describing the constitution of the PTAB).
28. Id. § 3(b)(1).
29. Id. § 3(b)(2)(A).
30. Id. § 6(a).
31. Id. § 3(b)(6).
32. Id. § 6(c).
33. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), abrogated in irrelevant part
by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), abrogated in irrelevant part by Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); see also John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges
Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 904, 908 (2009) (observing that BPAI members “are
not mere ‘alter ego[s] or agent[s]’ of the PTO Director” (quoting Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1535)).
34. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, SIDNEY SHAPIRO & PAUL VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND PROCESS § 9.2.1, at 492 (5th ed. 2009) (noting that due process requirements are violated
“where an administrator can be shown to have pre-judged the issues that will be litigated during
a hearing”).

GOLDEN IN PRINTER FINAL (UPDATED PAGE NUMBERS) (DO NOT DELETE)

1664

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/21/2016 3:38 PM

[Vol. 65:1657

due process, which the Federal Circuit explicitly declined to address
35
in its prior decision, might limit that directorial power over
rehearings so that this power is in fact narrower than the statute
36
facially allows.
Consistent with its name, “Patent Trial and Appeal Board,” the
PTAB is charged with hearing and deciding a diverse array of
matters: (1) appeals from “adverse decisions of examiners” in the
37
original examination of patent applications; (2) appeals of
38
reexaminations of issued patents; (3) disputes over whether a patent
39
applicant derived the invention from another or was the first
35. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1536 (acknowledging a due process challenge to “the
Commissioner’s redesignation practices” raised by an amicus curiae but holding that, as a result
of the relevant party’s waiver, due process questions were not eligible for the court’s review).
36. Cf. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009) (“We conclude that
there is a serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable perceptions—when a
person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence
in placing the judge on the case . . . .”); Duffy, supra note 33, at 908 (“Re-adjudication by the
PTO Director would also, at least with respect to individual factual issues, raise difficult issues
of due process.”). The Patent Act mandates that, “if on . . . examination it appears that the
applicant [for a patent] is entitled to a patent under the law, the Director shall issue a patent
therefor.” 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2012). The indicated entitlement to a patent is reinforced by a
provision for “remedy by civil action against the Director in the United States District court of
the Eastern District of Virginia,” in which “[t]he court may adjudge that such applicant is
entitled to receive a patent.” Id. § 145. In light of the prevailing entitlement test for the
existence of a property interest protected by a constitutional requirement of due process, see
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-9, at 686 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing the courts’ recognition of due process protection for “statutory entitlements”
“founded neither on constitutional nor on common law claims of right but only on a statefostered (and hence justifiable) expectation”), it is unsurprising that the Federal Circuit and its
patent-law predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, have treated due
process requirements as applying to pre-issuance examination of patents, see, e.g., In re Steed,
802 F.3d 1311, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sustaining PTO rejections of patent claims against a due
process challenge not because there was no due process requirement, but instead because the
PTO appeared to provide constitutionally adequate process); In re Baxter, 656 F.2d 679, 687
(Fed. Cir. 1981) (finding a “clear infringement of Baxter’s procedural due process rights” in the
PTO’s rejection of certain patent claims), as well as post-issuance proceedings to cancel patent
claims, Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 598–99 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that “[i]t is
beyond reasonable debate that patents are property” protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause”). See generally Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(holding that, as “[v]eteran’s disability benefits are nondiscretionary, statutorily mandated
benefits,” “entitlement to [them] is a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause”);
Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 116 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Statutory language may so specifically
mandate benefits awards upon demonstration of certain qualifications that an applicant must
fairly be recognized to have a limited property interest entitling him, at least, to process
sufficient to permit a demonstration of eligibility.”).
37. 35 U.S.C. § 6(b)(1).
38. Id. § 6(b)(2) (providing for PTAB review of “appeals of reexaminations”).
39. Id. § 6(b)(3) (providing for PTAB conduct of “derivation proceedings”).
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40

inventor; and (4) inter partes post-issuance challenges to the validity
41
of issued patent claims, including inter partes reviews, post-grant
42
43
reviews, and covered business method reviews. Like PTO
44
proceedings in general, PTAB proceedings commonly focus on
whether statutory requirements for patentability are met by specific
45
patent claims, which are the numbered clauses in a patent
application or issued patent that serve as the primary indicators of the
scope of technologies subject, or intended to be subject, to rights of
46
exclusion. Claims in a patent application that fail to meet statutory
47
requirements for patentability are subject to rejection. Claims in an
issued patent that fail to meet statutory requirements for patentability
48
are subject to cancellation.

40. See id. § 6(a) (“Any reference in any Federal law, Executive order, rule, regulation, or
delegation of authority, or any document of or pertaining to the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences is deemed to refer to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.”); id. § 135(a)
(providing, pre-AIA, for the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences to “determine
questions of priority”).
41. Id. § 6(b)(4) (providing for PTAB conduct of “inter partes reviews”); id. § 311(b) (“A
petitioner in an inter partes review may request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a
patent only on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of
prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.”).
42. Id. § 6(b)(4) (providing for PTAB conduct of “post-grant reviews”); id. § 321(b) (“A
petitioner in a post-grant review may request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a
patent on any ground that could be raised under paragraph (2) or (3) of section 282(b) (relating
to invalidity of the patent or any claim).”).
43. AIA § 18(a) (providing for “a transitional post-grant review proceeding for review of
the validity of covered business method patents” using “the standards and procedures of[] a
post-grant review”).
44. See Jay Erstling, Patent Law and the Duty of Candor: Rethinking the Limits of
Disclosure, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 329, 333 (2011) (“The job of the PTO and of a patent
examiner within the office is to examine each claim in an application to determine whether the
claim meets the requirements of patentability set forth in the Patent Act . . . .”).
45. Eleanor M. Yost & Stephen T. Schreiner, Patent Trial and Appeal Board Trials
Overhaul Patent Strategies, in ASPATORE THOUGHT LEADERSHIP, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW 2015, at 77, 78 (2015) (describing PTAB proceedings as involving “rulings regarding
institution of trials, discovery matters, and ultimately, the patentability of claims”).
46. See John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their “Interpretive
Community”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 322
(2008) (“Claims—numbered clauses at the end of a patent—are meant to provide notice of what
a patent covers . . . .”).
47. See JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 57 (4th ed. 2013) (“[T]he examiner may
initially ‘allow’ (i.e., approve) certain of the applicant’s claims and reject others, or (relatively
rarely) may allow all the claims, or (more typically) reject all the claims.”).
48. See id. at 421 (noting that a “Reexamination Certificate” issued at the end of a
reexamination will “cancel any claim of the issued patent that is determined to be
unpatentable”); id. at 432 (noting that a petitioner for inter partes review can ask the USPTO
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The PTAB’s powers and responsibilities are a substantial step-up
from those of its predecessor, the BPAI. Derivation proceedings, inter
partes reviews, post-grant reviews, and covered business method
49
reviews are all creatures of the 2011 America Invents Act. The
AIA’s provisions for inter partes, post-grant, and covered business
method review notably empower the PTAB to conduct more trial50
like proceedings than those previously conducted by the PTO.
Further, post-grant and covered business method reviews permit a
broader range of potential validity challenges than were previously
51
available in PTO post-issuance proceedings. Thus, the PTAB’s array
of new proceedings naturally make the PTAB a forum for postissuance validity challenges that competes more generally with the
52
district courts than the pre-AIA BPAI.
B. The PTAB’s Growth and High Caseload
In addition to the scope of validity issues that the PTAB may
hear, the number of cases already under PTAB review attest to its

“to cancel as unpatentable one or more claims of a patent”); id. at 435 (observing that the aim of
a petitioner for post-grant review is to “persuad[e] the USPTO to cancel [a patent’s] claims”).
49. See Raymond A. Mercado, Ensuring the Integrity of Administrative Challenges to
Patents: Lessons from Reexamination, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 558, 561 n.6 (2013)
(“With the passage of the America Invents Act, inter partes reexamination was repealed and
replaced by three new administrative procedures for challenging patents: post-grant review,
inter partes review, and the so-called ‘transitional program for covered business method
patents,’ which follows roughly the same procedures as post-grant review.”); Tran, supra note 2,
at 629–37 (discussing post-issuance proceedings under the AIA).
50. See, e.g., Andrei Iancu, Ben Haber & Elizabeth Iglesias, Inter Partes Review Is the New
Normal: What Has Been Lost? What Has Been Gained?, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 539, 541 (2012) (“[T]he
new IPR procedures, defined by both the AIA and the PTO’s rules, are more ‘trial-like’ than
the PTO’s prior Reexam practice.”); Sarah Tran, Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 487, 493 (2012) (discussing PTO rulemaking authority relating to “its new and
fortified trial-like proceedings, including derivation, post-grant review, and inter partes review
proceedings”).
51. See John M. Golden, Patent Privateers: Private Enforcement’s Historical Survivors, 26
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 613–14 (2013) [hereinafter Golden, Patent Privateers] (observing that,
in 2011, Congress provided for “a new form of post-grant review in which third parties can
challenge patentability on broader grounds than reexamination had made available”).
52. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (2012) (“A petitioner in a post-grant review may request
to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent on any ground that could be raised under
paragraph (2) or (3) of section 282(b) (relating to invalidity of the patent or any claim).”), and
AIA § 18(a) (providing for “review of the validity of covered business method patents” using
“the standards and procedures of[] a post-grant review”), with 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (identifying as
a defense to a patent-infringement suit brought in district court the “[i]nvalidity of the patent or
any claim in suit on any ground specified in part II [of the Patent Act] as a condition for
patentability”).
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substantial role in the post-AIA power structure of U.S. patent law.
From mid-2014 through the third quarter of 2015, filings for inter
partes post-issuance proceedings before the PTAB arrived at a rate of
53
about 150 per month. Hence, this single administrative body already
has a case flow of petitions for inter partes review equaling nearly
one-third of the flow of new patent cases into all the U.S. district
54
courts. Moreover, such inter partes case flow is only a fraction of the
PTAB’s overall caseload. The PTAB tends to resolve approximately
ten thousand appeals each year in ex parte proceedings involving only
55
the patent applicant or owner. The demand for resolution of such ex
parte appeals is relentless: as of September 2015, the PTAB faced a
56
backlog of over twenty thousand pending ex parte appeals.
Unsurprisingly, the PTO has hired PTAB judges at a rapid rate
to try to meet the avalanche of incoming work. The BPAI had eighty57
one judges in 2010, the year before passage of the America Invents
58
Act. By August 2015, the PTAB had 235 members, almost triple the
53. Brian J. Love, Inter Partes Review as a Shield for Technology Purchasers: A Response to
Gaia Bernstein’s The Rise of the End-User in Patent Litigation, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1075, 1079
(2015) (noting that there was “a full-blown explosion of [inter partes review] filings in 2014”);
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS 3
(Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-09-30%20PTAB.pdf
[http://perma.cc/W5ZL-ESZZ] (showing graphs for numbers of petitions for inter partes review,
covered business method review, and post-grant review filed in each month from February 2013
through September 2015).
54. See Cases Filed by Year, LEX MACHINA (Mar. 28, 2015) (on file with the author)
(listing figures indicating that an average of about 460 patent cases were filed per month in U.S.
district courts from 2012 through 2014).
55. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2014 PATENT TRIAL &
APPEAL BOARD RECEIPTS AND DISPOSITIONS BY TECHNOLOGY CENTERS: EX PARTE
APPEALS (2014), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ip/boards/bpai/stats/receipts/fy2014sep-e.pdf [http://perma.cc/8JQ4-DEVQ].
56. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, SEPT. 2015 PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
(PTAB) DATA, http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patenttrialandappealboard/main.dashxml
[https://perma.cc/7HSG-UHGE] (listing 20,212 “Ex Parte Appeals” and 49 “Ex Parte
Reexamination” appeals as pending before the PTAB).
57. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE
QUARTERLY MEETING: PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD UPDATE 29 (Aug. 20, 2015),
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/20150820_PPAC_PTAB_Update.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8627-MBP8] [hereinafter PTAB UPDATE (Aug. 2015)] (providing a graph indicating
numbers of Board members in 2010, 2015, and select other years).
58. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
L-9 (May 2014) (noting that the new provisions for the PTAB as a replacement for the BPAI
became effective on September 16, 2012); see also Aashish Kapadia, Inter Partes Review: A New
Paradigm in Patent Litigation, 23 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 113, 114 (2015) (noting that, under
the AIA, “the Patent Trial and Appeal[] Board (PTAB) succeeded the previous Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI)”).
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59

BPAI’s 2010 membership. The size of the PTAB’s membership has
spurred evolution of its organizational hierarchy, which currently
features not only a chief judge, but also a deputy chief judge, two vice
chief judges, and lead administrative patent judges for each of twelve
60
divisions overseen by one of the vice chief judges.
C. Early Impacts of PTAB Decisionmaking
Of course, the volume and substantive scope of PTAB
proceedings might matter little if the PTAB generated no notable
results. Given patent law’s virtually constant need to adapt to new
61
technologies and applicant tactics, however, the PTAB will have
trouble avoiding the front lines of many major legal developments.
Indeed, the PTAB has already made a splash through its initial
decisions. The results of the PTAB’s first eighty written merits
decisions in inter partes review were eye opening: Gregory Dolin
reported that all patent claims at issue were canceled in fifty-two of
the decisions and that more than 70 percent of claims at issue were
62
stricken overall. Such early results caught the attention of members
of the patent community. Former Chief Judge Rader of the Federal
Circuit described the PTAB panels as “death squads killing property
rights” at an annual meeting of the American Intellectual Property
63
Law Association.

59. PTAB UPDATE (Aug. 2015), supra note 57, at 34.
60. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND
ADMINISTRATION OF THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD (2015), http://www.uspto.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/Organizational%20Structure%20of%20the%20Board%20May%
2012%202015.pdf [http://perma.cc/S7DD-BTUT] (describing “how the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board is structured and manages its workload”).
61. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L.
REV. 1041, 1083 (2011) [hereinafter Golden, Patentable Subject Matter] (“The malleability of
technology and of techniques of patent claim drafting mean that the policing of [subject-matter
eligibility] bounds requires not only continuous vigilance, but also continual updating of
guidelines for examiners and courts alike.”); John M. Golden, Proliferating Patents and Patent
Law’s “Cost Disease”, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 455, 458–59 (2013) [hereinafter Golden, Proliferating
Patents] (contending that the longer-term tendency toward growth in rates of patenting “creates
constant tension as public and private bureaucracies, as well as individuals, struggle to keep
up”).
62. Dolin, supra note 16, at 926.
63. Rob Sterne & Gene Quinn, PTAB Death Squads: Are All Commercially Viable Patents
Invalid?, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/03/24/ptab-deathsquads-are-all-commercially-viable-patents-invalid/id=48642 [https://perma.cc/4BB7-C3KV]; see
also Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 13 (noting then–Chief Judge Rader’s statement and others’
concern that “the Board is out of control”).
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The PTAB’s rates of claim cancellation have cooled with time,
but the Board’s record in winnowing patent claims remains
impressive. As of January 15, 2015, the PTAB found unpatentable 36
percent of the claims at issue in 173 inter partes reviews and a further
15 percent of claims at issue in those proceedings were as of that date,
64
otherwise canceled or disclaimed. In short, PTAB proceedings still
seemed to lead to approximately half of all claims at issue falling by
the wayside. In combination with the comparatively low cost of
challenging claims before the PTAB, as opposed to before a district
65
court, this record helps explain the popularity of PTAB proceedings
with many patent challengers.
The PTAB has also attracted attention through another aspect of
its early decisions—the PTAB’s common rejection of motions to
66
amend patent claims in inter partes review. The PTAB reads PTO
regulations as demanding that, in support of such an amendment, the
patent owner bears the burden of “show[ing] patentable distinction
67
over the prior art of record,” including “prior art from the patent’s
68
original prosecution history.” For many patent owners, the PTAB’s
stringent approach to claim amendments has effectively taken away a
crucial traditional tool in the patent attorney’s kit—the ability to
64. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER PARTES REVIEW PETITIONS
TERMINATED TO DATE (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
inter_partes_review_petitions_terminated_to_date%2001%2015%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2NYW-F8GK].
65. Stephanie E. O’Byrne, IPRs and ANDA Litigation: All a Matter of Timing, 62 FED.
LAW. 55, 55 (Jan./Feb. 2015) (noting that “[a]n IPR offers undeniable cost advantages as
compared to traditional patent litigation,” perhaps in the nature of a reduction in relevant
attorney fees by a factor of seven); see also AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF
THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2015, at 37–38 (reporting survey results indicating that median total
costs for inter partes proceedings through appeal are $350,000, whereas district-court-based
patent litigation involves median litigation costs of $2 million or more when at least $1 million is
at issue).
66. Dolin, supra note 16, at 929 (noting that, in final decisions, the PTAB has rejected
forty-six out of forty-eight associated motions to amend, with the only motion granted having
been an unopposed motion by the U.S. Government); Tony Dutra, Fed. Cir. Oks PTAB Limits
on Amending Challenged Patents, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.—DAILY ED., Dec. 7,
2015 (“Patent stakeholders repeatedly point out that, after three years of handling post-grant
challenges enabled by the America Invents Act, the board has only granted motions to amend
in five cases.”).
67. Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Idle
Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., No. 2012-00027, 2013 WL 5947697, at *4 (P.T.A.B. June 11,
2013)).
68. Prolitec, Inc. v. Scentair Techs., Inc., 807 F.3d 1353, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (upholding
the PTAB’s ruling “that the patentee’s burden on a motion to amend includes the burden to
show patentability over prior art from the patent’s original prosecution history”).
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overcome arguments against the patentability of individual claims by
amending those claims to make clearer or greater distinctions from
prior art or to tie the claims more closely to the patent document’s
69
supporting disclosure. The PTAB’s approach in this regard sharply
distinguished new inter partes post-issuance proceedings, in which the
PTAB acts as trial court, from more traditional ex parte examination
and reexamination proceedings, in which narrowing claim
70
amendments have been readily available.
Significantly, the Federal Circuit’s review of PTAB decisions has
not undercut the PTAB’s apparently robust powers. For much of
2015, the Federal Circuit “affirm[ed] without opinion almost half the
judgments made by the [PTO],” which were “almost all from the
71
[PTAB].” Moreover, by the end of 2015, the Federal Circuit had
repeatedly upheld the PTAB’s stringent approach to claim
amendments in inter partes review under a highly deferential standard
72
of review that applies to an agency’s interpretation of its regulations.
In short, not only has the PTAB demonstrated itself to be a body that
can shake the landscape of patent law, but it has also shown that it
can make its rulings stick by winning affirmation by the Federal
Circuit.
II. CONTINUING LIMITATIONS ON PTO AUTHORITY
Despite the PTO’s increased capacities in relation to postissuance review, the agency still has substantial limits on its powers
relative to those of Article III district courts. Section II.A discusses
some traditional limitations on PTO authority that appear to persist,
and Section II.B focuses on one particular limitation that this Article

69. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CRAIG ALLEN NARD, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PAULINE
NEWMAN & F. SCOTT KIEFF, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 102 (3d ed.
2004) (“Usually, a response [to claim rejections and objections] includes both claim
amendments and arguments designed to distinguish the invention as claimed from any prior art
cited by the examiner.”).
70. See Dolin, supra note 16, at 902 (“During the reexamination proceedings the patentee
can amend his claims to narrow (but not broaden) their scope, much like he would be able to do
during the initial examination.”).
71. Tony Dutra, Fed. Cir. Affirming Half of PTAB Decisions Without Opinion, 90 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 3621, 3621 (2015).
72. See Prolitec, 807 F.3d at 1363 (upholding as “reasonable” a PTAB position “that the
patentee’s burden on a motion to amend includes the burden to show patentability over prior
art from the patent’s original prosecution history”); Proxyconn, 789 F.3d at 1307 (concluding the
PTAB “reasonably interpreted” relevant regulations “as requiring the patentee to show that its
substitute claims [we]re patentable over the prior art of record”).
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contends most likely continues: the PTO’s lack of Chevron deference
from the courts for its interpretation of the Patent Act’s substantive
provisions.
A. Traditional Limitations on PTO Authority
Most obviously, the PTO continues to lack jurisdiction over
73
questions of infringement. Further, in part because of its use of a
“broadest reasonable construction” approach to interpreting patent
74
claims, the PTO has limited its potential influence on claim
constructions in district court actions and actions before the
International Trade Commission, in both of which forms of action a
75
“best construction” approach prevails. Further, “courts view the
PTO as lacking any general grant of so-called ‘substantive rulemaking
authority’ and, thus, as generally not meriting high-level (Chevron)
deference for its interpretations of substantive aspects of the Patent
76
Act.” Chevron deference traces back to the Supreme Court’s 1984
decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
77
Council, Inc. When Chevron applies, a court is to “uphol[d] an
agency’s statutory interpretations not merely when the court agrees
with that interpretation, but also whenever the interpretation is
78
reasonable and not ‘contrary to the statute.’” The doctrine does not
apply to all agency interpretations of statutes, however, even when
the statute in question is the agency’s organic statute. Under the

73. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement
of his patent.”); Golden, Patentable Subject Matter, supra note 61, at 1053 (“[T]he USPTO has
historically had no direct involvement with determinations of whether an accused infringer’s
conduct in fact constitutes infringement . . . .”).
74. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1278–79 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (concluding
that, as with other PTO proceedings, the “broadest reasonable construction” approach applies
to PTO inter partes review proceedings).
75. See Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. Open E Cry, LLC, 728 F.3d 1309, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(describing a prior decision as “determin[ing] the best construction for a single disputed claim
term”); Broadcom Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 542 F.3d 894, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(rejecting a proposed construction as “contrary to the most reasonable interpretation of the
claims”); Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Empak, Inc., 268 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (declaring the
nature of “the best interpretation of the patent”).
76. Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power, supra note 7, at 542; see also Joseph Scott Miller,
Substance, Procedure, and the Divided Patent Power, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 32–33 (2011) (“It is
settled that Congress has given the Patent Office the power to issue procedural rules for patent
examination at the Office, not substantive rulemaking power of the sort federal agencies
typically possess.”).
77. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
78. Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power, supra note 7, at 547.
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Supreme Court’s later decision in United States v. Mead Corp.,
Chevron applies only when Congress is understood to have delegated
relevant authority and when “the agency interpretation claiming
80
deference was promulgated in the exercise of such authority.”
Consequently, the Federal Circuit’s pre-Mead holding that the PTO
generally lacked the authority necessary to obtain Chevron deference
81
for its interpretations of substantive provisions of the Patent Act can
be understood in a post-Mead world as deciding that, in general,
Congress failed to delegate to the PTO the interpretive authority
required for Chevron deference for the PTO’s interpretations of such
provisions.
The AIA undoubtedly extended the PTO’s rulemaking
authority—for example, by empowering the PTO to issue rules to
82
establish and govern the various new post-issuance proceedings.
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has recently acknowledged that, under
the AIA, the PTO has a new grant of authority to issue regulations on
the standards for instituting inter partes review and on the more
83
general governance of inter partes review. The Federal Circuit has
further acknowledged that high-level Chevron deference may apply
to such regulations and has applied such deference as at least an
alternative basis for upholding the PTO’s application of a broadest
reasonable interpretation standard for claim construction in inter
84
partes review.
On the other hand, the Federal Circuit has viewed such new
rulemaking authority as only a limited addition to the PTO’s powers,
not one calling into question the prior understanding that PTO
85
rulemaking authority is limited, rather than general. Even in
79. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
80. Id. at 226–27.
81. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that “the rule of
controlling deference set forth in Chevron does not apply” because of the PTO’s lack of
“general substantive rulemaking power” and the relevant interpretation’s consequent lack of
“force and effect of law” (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979))).
82. See Tran, supra note 2, at 662–73 (listing AIA provisions conferring or describing
rulemaking authority).
83. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting
statutory provisions on the PTO’s power to issue regulations relating to inter partes review).
84. Id. at 1279 (“The regulation here presents a reasonable interpretation of the statute.”).
85. See Merck & Co., 80 F.3d at 1549 (“Congress has not vested the [PTO] Commissioner
with any general substantive rulemaking power.”); cf. Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing
Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1998
(2013) (observing that the AIA “declined to grant the PTO the robust substantive rule-making
powers that had been proposed in earlier versions of the legislation”).
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according Chevron deference with respect to the PTO’s approach to
claim construction in inter partes review, the Federal Circuit
emphasized that it had not made “any finding that Congress has
newly granted the PTO power to interpret substantive statutory
‘patentability’ standards,” a grant that, according to the Federal
Circuit, would have effected “a radical change in the authority
86
historically conferred on the PTO by Congress.” Likewise, in a postAIA decision issued in 2013, the Supreme Court appeared to reaffirm
the view that the PTO has no general entitlement to great deference
on questions of substantive patent law by declining to give such
87
deference to “the [PTO’s] past practice of awarding gene patents.”
The PTO’s continued lack of general rulemaking authority thus
appears to leave it substantially hampered in its ability to determine
the course of patent law’s development and application. Unlike many
other administrative agencies, it cannot effectively bind the courts to
88
follow any reasonable interpretation of its organic statute. Instead,
for a PTO interpretation to prevail, Article III courts must be
convinced that the interpretation is not only reasonable but should, in
fact, be understood to be correct.
B. Apparently Continuing Limitation of PTO Interpretive Authority
Multiple commentators have suggested that, despite the PTO’s
lack of general rulemaking authority, the AIA’s new provisions for
post-issuance proceedings make PTAB decisionmaking a potential
vehicle for the PTO to obtain Chevron deference on questions of
89
substantive patent law. This Section contends that, except to the
86. Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1279.
87. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2118 (2013).
88. See Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power, supra note 7, at 541–42 (“Like many other
administrative agencies, the SEC can receive high-level Chevron deference when the courts
review its interpretations of the statutes it administers.”).
89. See Karen A. Lorang, The Unintended Consequences of Post-Grant Review of Patents,
17 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 31 (2013) (“I predict that the Federal Circuit will also be required to
give Chevron deference to the Board’s other legal conclusions made during post-grant review,
including statutory interpretations of section 101 regarding patent eligible subject matter.”);
Arti K. Rai, Improving (Software) Patent Quality Through the Administrative Process, 51 HOUS.
L. REV. 503, 540 (2013) (“[D]octrinal analysis would indicate that the Federal Circuit should
give Chevron deference to any legal determinations made by the agency in [the PTO’s] new
proceedings.”); Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations
for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1239 (2012) (contending that use of relatively
formal post-grant review to implement PTO guidelines on issues of substantive patent law
would result in “the strong form of deference enunciated by the Court in [Chevron] and its
progeny”); Wasserman, supra note 85, at 1965 (contending that recent statutory changes

GOLDEN IN PRINTER FINAL (UPDATED PAGE NUMBERS) (DO NOT DELETE)

1674

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/21/2016 3:38 PM

[Vol. 65:1657

extent statutory provisions relating to such proceedings provide
pertinent rulemaking authority, these provisions are unlikely to
90
provide new general grounds for Chevron deference. As noted
above, in Mead, the Supreme Court “held that an agency is entitled to
deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC only if Congress has
delegated to that agency the authority to issue interpretations that
carry the force of law, and the agency has used that authority in
91
issuing a particular interpretation.” There is little evidence that
Congress intended a broad, implicit delegation of such interpretive
authority to the PTO when acting through the PTAB in post-issuance
adjudication.
This Section supports this contention as follows. Subsection
II.B.1 discusses how basic statutory language and context, including
legislative history, fails to support the notion that Congress delegated
general interpretive authority on substantive issues to the PTO
overall or to the PTAB more specifically. Subsection II.B.2 discusses
statutory language and legislative history specifically directed to
PTAB post-issuance proceedings. Subsections II.B.3 through II.B.5
focus on how PTAB proceedings and their review differ from classic
models for formal adjudication and otherwise suggest both a lack of
delegation of relevant authority and a lack of exercise of such
authority under Mead. Subsection II.B.6 suggests that PTAB
decisions designated as precedential might provide the best general
case for such decisions meriting Chevron when they interpret
substantive provisions of the Patent Act. But Subsection II.B.6 also
“anoin[t] the PTO as the chief expositor of substantive patent law standards”); cf. Stuart Minor
Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from
Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 327–28 (2007) (describing proposed post-grant review
proceedings as involving “trial-type procedures” to which “Chevron deference would seem to
apply”).
90. Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power, supra note 7, at 545–46 (questioning arguments “that
Congress’s 2011 adoption of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) has effectively given
the USPTO the power to develop presumptively binding interpretations of substantive patent
law when the USPTO acts through certain forms of administrative adjudication”).
91. Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (2005); see also Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 537 (2014) (describing the great majority of U.S. Supreme Court
Justices as having agreed that “Congress often, but not always, intends for an agency rather than
the courts to shoulder primary responsibility for filling statutory gaps” and that “not every
action by an agency or its representatives reflects the identification of and deliberate effort to
fill a statutory gap in the Chevron sense”); Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of
Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 753, 766 (2014) (describing Mead as holding “that Chevron is
subject to a Step Zero inquiry . . . asking whether the agency has been delegated authority to act
with the force of law” and whether the agency exercised that authority).
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argues that, at least under current procedures and in light of statutory
silence relating to precedential status, even such decisions appear to
fall short under Mead.
1. General AIA Language and Context Relating to PTO
Interpretive Authority. New provisions of the Patent Act added by
the AIA do not provide explicit indication that the PTO is now meant
to have general access to Chevron-level authority through decisions
of the PTAB. Of course, such a delegation of interpretive authority
92
need not be explicit. But in light of the history of this authority’s
established denial, a related refusal of general rulemaking authority
in the legislative history of the AIA, and a concomitant expansion of
the Federal Circuit’s role as the primary, day-to-day expositor of
substantive patent law, argument for inferring such a delegation
threatens to be an instance of contending, in the words of the
Supreme Court, that Congress has “hid[den] elephants in
93
mouseholes.”
As the Federal Circuit recently noted, “any finding that Congress
has newly granted the PTO power to interpret substantive statutory
‘patentability’ standards . . . would represent a radical change in the
authority historically [understood to be] conferred on the PTO by
94
Congress.” Thus, the Supreme Court’s admonition—described by
95
one commentator as a new canon of statutory interpretation —about
the implausibility of inferring the presence of elephants in
mouseholes, appears to apply. To the extent one subscribes to a
traditional principle that courts should continue to demand a high
degree of clarity when Congress overturns pre-existing legal
96
precedent or statutory law, this principle provides a further, related

92. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (“[I]t can still be apparent from
the agency’s generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress
would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in
the statute . . . .”).
93. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 486 (2000).
94. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
95. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Communicating the Canons: How Lower Courts React When
the Supreme Court Changes the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 100 MINN. L. REV. 481, 542
(2015) (“The ‘no elephants in mouseholes’ canon now occupies a secure, if limited, place in the
interpretive landscape.”).
96. 3 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 58.3, at 115–17 (7th ed. 2008) (noting “a conservative policy of resistance to
change in the traditional structure of law” but also reporting a “trend away from strict
construction of statutes in derogation of established law”).
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reason to believe that the AIA has not slipped the PTO a general,
PTAB-based path to Chevron-level interpretive authority.
Perhaps even more tellingly, the legislative history for the AIA
suggests that Congress was unlikely to have been ignorant of how
radical a step such a conferral of Chevron-level authority would be.
That history “prominently featured the trouncing of a proposal to
97
give the PTO general rulemaking authority,” a grant of authority
that would presumably entail implicit delegation of such interpretive
98
authority. The explicit rejection of such a proposed grant in the
legislative history provides at least prima facie reason to suspect that
Congress was not contemplating “radical change” in the PTO’s
interpretive authority.
Moreover, despite vociferous academic criticism of the Federal
99
Circuit’s handling of patent law and prominent calls for the court to
100
be divested of its largely exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals,
the AIA in fact expanded the Federal Circuit’s role as primary, dayto-day expositor of substantive patent law by extending the Federal
Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction to encompass compulsory

97. Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power, supra note 7, at 545.
98. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (making the lack of a
grant of “any general substantive rulemaking power” to the PTO the linchpin of a decision not
to accord Chevron deference to PTO interpretation of a substantive statutory provision); cf.
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001) (specifically noting the significance of
notice-and-comment rulemaking to the likelihood of “Chevron authority”); Abbe R. Gluck &
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 999 (2013)
(observing that the overwhelming majority of congressional staffers surveyed “told us that the
authorization of notice-and-comment rulemaking (the signal identified by the court in Mead) is
always or often relevant to whether drafters intend for an agency to have gap-filling authority”).
99. See, e.g., David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication:
Precedent and Policy, 66 SMU L. REV. 633, 636 (2013) (“[T]he criticism of the Federal Circuit as
formalistic has been withering.”).
100. See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity
Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1625 (2007) (“We propose that, in addition to the Federal
Circuit, at least one extant circuit court should be allowed to hear district court appeals relating
to patent law. In addition, both the Federal Circuit and [the D.C. Circuit] should have
jurisdiction over appeals from the PTO . . . .”); Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Response Essay, Rethinking
Federal Circuit Jurisdiction—A Short Comment, 100 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 23, 27 (2012) (arguing
for “[r]estoring appellate jurisdiction in patent infringement cases to the regular circuit courts of
appeals”); Diane P. Wood, Keynote Address, Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s
Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 9–10 (2013)
(advocating a regime in which parties in patent-infringement suits have “the option of seeking
review either in the Federal Circuit or in the regional circuit with jurisdiction over the district
court from which the appeal is taken”).
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101

counterclaims. As the Federal Circuit could effectively lose this role
as primary, day-to-day expositor if the PTO were to obtain a general
path to Chevron-level interpretive authority through the PTAB,
Congress’s determination to expand the Federal Circuit’s role as
substantive expositor on another front provides further reason to
suspect that Congress would have provided a strong signal if it
intended to undercut this role by conferring relevant interpretive
authority on the PTO.
In short, generally speaking, the AIA’s provisions and broader
context provide little reason to suspect that Congress snuck
delegation of Chevron-level authority for the PTO through the back
door of PTAB post-issuance proceedings. Subsections II.B.2 to II.B.4
provide further reasons for believing that neither such a grant of
authority nor its exercise is implied by the nature of the PTAB and
the proceedings it conducts.
2. Statutory Language and History Specific to PTAB PostIssuance Proceedings. Relevant legislative history specific to PTAB
102
proceedings appears scant. At least one commentator has argued,
however, that Congress substantially signaled its intent to confer
Chevron-level interpretive authority through PTAB proceedings by
103
explicitly providing a broad range of grounds for post-grant review.
But the sorts of validity issues that may be raised in post-grant review
or the PTAB’s other post-issuance proceedings are far from

101. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II,
21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 539–40 (2012) (noting that section 19 of the America Invents Act
“extend[ed] the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction to compulsory patent and plant-varietyprotection counterclaims”); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012) (giving the Federal Circuit
exclusive jurisdiction over “an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United
States . . . in any civil action arising under, or in any civil action in which a party has asserted a
compulsory counterclaim arising under, any Act of Congress relating to patents or plant variety
protection”).
102. Cf. Benjamin J. Christoff, Blurring the Boundaries: How the Additional Grounds for
Post-Grant Review in the America Invents Act Raise Issues with Separation of Powers and the
Administrative Procedure Act, 39 U. DAYTON L. REV. 111, 127 (2013) (lamenting the lack of
much evidence “about Congress’ intent” in relation to a provision allowing the PTO to institute
post-grant review to address a new legal question).
103. See Wasserman, supra note 85, at 1993 (contending that the AIA’s provision for
institution of post-grant review to address a “novel or unsettled legal question that [is]
important to other patents or patent applications,” 35 U.S.C. § 324(b), “provides strong support
that Congress intended postgrant review to be accompanied with a policy-making or lawmaking ability”); id. (“Allowing the PTO to decide all contours of patentability during the
postgrant review also supports the notion that Congress intended the agency to play a larger
policy-making function.”).
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unprecedented parts of the PTO’s docket: the PTO already had
power to address challenges to patent validity on more limited
104
grounds in pre-AIA reexamination proceedings, and the PTO has
generally had power to address any requirement for patentability in
105
original examination.
Further, explicit statutory allowance for instituting post-grant
review on the ground that a validity challenge “raises a novel or
unsettled legal question that is important to other patents or patent
106
applications” does not necessarily indicate congressional intent that
the PTO has greater authority to resolve novel or unsettled legal
questions essentially conclusively. Perhaps the only detailed
107
legislative history on point—statements by Senator Jon Kyl —
appears to point in the opposite direction. Senator Kyl described this
ground for PTO review as enabling the agency “to reconsider an
important legal question and to effectively certify it for Federal
108
[C]ircuit resolution.” Hence, in Senator Kyl’s account, the utility of
post-grant review was substantially predicated on its capacity for
enabling relatively early Federal Circuit decision. Moreover, Senator
Kyl appeared to contemplate that the Federal Circuit would assess
whether the PTO’s position was correct, not merely whether it was
reasonable. According to the Senator, situations that would call for
judicial reversal of the agency’s course would be ones in which the
PTO’s position “is wrong” or “incorrect”—not only, as would be
expected with Chevron-level review, situations in which the PTO’s
109
position is unreasonable.
Indeed, Senator Kyl’s remarks reinforce the sense that the
Federal Circuit, not the PTO, is to remain the primary, day-to-day
104. See MUELLER, supra note 47, at 423 (describing potential grounds for reexamination).
105. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (“A petitioner in a post-grant review may request to
cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent on any ground that could be raised under
paragraph (2) or (3) of section 282(b) (relating to invalidity of the patent or any claim).”), with
id. § 131 (providing for examination of patent applications to determine whether an “applicant
is entitled to a patent under the law”), and MUELLER, supra note 47, at 56 (“The examiner’s job
is to determine whether the application and the invention claimed therein satisfy the various
statutory requirements for the issuance of a patent.”).
106. 35 U.S.C. § 324(b).
107. See Christoff, supra note 102, at 127 (highlighting Senator Kyl’s statements “in 2008,
when the provision was originally proposed”).
108. 154 CONG. REC. S9982, S9988 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kyl); cf. 157
CONG. REC. S1368, S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (asserting the
relevance of 2008 remarks on “what is now section 324(b)’s additional threshold for instituting a
post-grant review”).
109. 154 CONG. REC. S9982, S9988 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
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authority on the meaning of substantive provisions of the Patent Act.
Senator Kyl’s remarks signal this by specifically describing post-grant
review as a means for the PTO “to effectively certify” questions so
110
that they might be “conclusively resolved by the Federal [C]ircuit.”
As Verity Winship has noted, “[d]efined broadly, certification is a
procedure by which one entity is able to obtain from the determining
111
entity a conclusive answer to a question of law.” Hence, Senator
Kyl’s certification language casts the Federal Circuit in the role of the
relevant “determining entity,” rather than that of a deferential
reviewer of the opinion of a law’s primary interpretive authority.
More generally, Senator Kyl’s statements provide a common
sense explanation for the broad grounds for post-grant proceedings
that does not require recognition of new interpretive authority for the
PTO when acting through post-issuance proceedings. By providing a
wide administrative avenue for private-party challenges that could
112
sidestep traditional requirements for Article III standing, the broad
grounds for post-grant review could facilitate judicial review of
disputed, pro-patentee legal decisions by the PTO “before a large
number of improper patents are granted and allowed to unjustifiably
113
disrupt an industry.” In contrast to an adversarial proceeding such
as post-grant review, pro-patentee legal decisions made by the PTO
in ex parte processes of examination or reexamination are more likely
to escape judicial review indefinitely for the simple reason that there
is no party to the administrative proceeding positioned to make a
direct appeal. The patent applicant would, generally speaking, have
neither a legal basis nor an incentive to challenge the PTO’s ruling.
Moreover, until threatened with a suit for infringement, others would

110. Id.
111. Verity Winship, Cooperative Interbranch Federalism: Certification of State-Law
Questions by Federal Agencies, 63 VAND. L. REV. 181, 184–85 (2010) (“Defined broadly,
certification is a procedure by which one entity is able to obtain from the determining entity a
conclusive answer to a question of law.”); see also Allan D. Vestal, The Certified Question of
Law, 36 IOWA L. REV. 629, 629–30 (1951) (“Basically, certification of questions of law is a
procedure by which an inferior court is able to obtain from a defining court a conclusive answer
to a material question of law.”).
112. See Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed.
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1401 (2015) (“[W]here Congress has accorded a procedural
right to a litigant, such as the right to appeal an administrative decision, certain requirements of
standing—namely immediacy and redressability, as well as prudential aspects that are not part
of Article III—may be relaxed.”).
113. 154 CONG. REC. S9982, S9988 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
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likely lack Article III standing to bring a declaratory judgment action
114
challenging the PTO’s decision.
3. AIA Proceedings’ Deviation from Standard Formal
Adjudication. The argument that Congress did not implicitly intend
for PTAB proceedings to be a vehicle for a broad expansion of the
PTO’s interpretive authority is supported by the AIA’s structural
provisions for how Board decisions would be reviewed. Although
Congress enacted language requiring the PTAB’s administrative
115
patent judges to sit in panels of “at least 3,” Congress appears to
have made no explicit provision for review of panel decisions by a
person or relatively small-numbered body representing the overall
opinion of the agency—for example, by the Director of the PTO, who
is “appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate” and in whom, by statute, “[t]he powers and duties of the
116
[PTO are] vested.” Instead, the U.S. Patent Act explicitly confers
on the Federal Circuit the job of reviewing Board judgments in inter
117
partes review and post-grant review —arguably reaffirming a
congressional understanding that the Federal Circuit, rather than the
agency, is truly the primary, day-to-day authority on the substantive
meaning of U.S. patent law.
Although PTAB proceedings appear to involve various aspects
118
of formal adjudication as explicitly contemplated by the APA, the

114. See Golden, Patent Privateers, supra note 51, at 549 (describing still restrictive
requirements for “standing to challenge patents in district court”); Golden, Patentable Subject
Matter, supra note 61, at 1086–87 (noting possibilities for substantial delays in subject-matter
eligibility questions being presented to courts).
115. ERIKA HARMON ARNER & JOSEPH EDWIN PALYS, THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO
TRIALS BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 21 (E.H. Arner & J.E. Palys eds.,
2014) (“Both [post-grant review] and [inter partes review] proceedings will be conducted before
a three-judge panel of administrative patent judges . . . .”); cf. 35 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2012) (“Each
appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review shall be heard by at
least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, who shall be designated by the
Director.”).
116. 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(1).
117. 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) (“A party to an inter partes review or a post-grant review who is
dissatisfied with the final written decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board under section
318(a) or 328(a) (as the case may be) may appeal the Board’s decision only to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”); id. § 319 (providing for appeal to the Federal
Circuit from a final Board decision in inter partes review); id. § 329 (providing for appeal to the
Federal Circuit from a final Board decision in post-grant review).
118. Cf. Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, Nos. 2015-1513 & 2015-1514, 2016 WL 1019075, at *6
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2016) (“For a formal adjudication like the inter partes review considered
here, the APA imposes particular requirements on the PTO.”).
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Patent Act’s provisions for Federal Circuit review of PTAB decisions
without intervening whole-agency review contrast substantially with a
specific provision in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for
whole-agency review in formal adjudication. If “the agency”—for
example, the full body of commissioners within an agency such as the
International Trade Commission—does “not preside at the reception
of the evidence” in formal adjudication, the APA appears generally
to contemplate that there will be a later opportunity for review by
“the agency” of the “initial decision” made by the individual or
119
individuals who do preside over evidentiary hearings. Thus, for
example, in formal adjudication before the International Trade
Commission, an administrative law judge (ALJ) typically presides
120
over evidentiary hearings. The ALJ issues a decision on the merits
121
that constitutes the agency’s “initial determination.” A party may
appeal this determination to the Commission—that is, the ITC
122
Commissioners sitting as an adjudicatory body. An adverse “final
determination” by the Commission may be appealed to the Federal
123
Circuit.
The PTAB’s use of administrative patent judges (APJs), rather
than ALJs, itself provides a difference from formal adjudication as
124
explicitly contemplated by the APA. For purposes of assessing
whether Congress delegated Chevron-level interpretive authority, the
level of formality of PTAB proceedings is significant because, under
Mead, “[i]t is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates
administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a
relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the
fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of
119. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (“On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all
the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on
notice or by rule.”).
120. Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1555 (2011)
(discussing how the ITC refers cases to ALJs who preside over “formal evidentiary hearing[s]”).
121. Id. (“The ALJ then issues an Initial Determination (‘ID’) on whether section 337 has
been violated and recommends a remedy.” (footnotes omitted)).
122. Id. at 1556 (“Once the [ALJ’s initial determination] issues, a party may request review
by the ITC’s six-member Commission; the Commission can also choose to review the decision
on its own initiative.”).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6) (providing the Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over
appeals); see also Kumar, supra note 120, at 1549 (“The Federal Circuit . . . hears appeals of
patent decisions from . . . the U.S. International Trade Commission (‘ITC’).”).
124. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 34, § 6.4.3a, at 322 (“All formal adjudications must be
presided over by (1) the agency; (2) one or more members of the body which comprises the
agency; or[] (3) one or more Administrative Law Judges (ALJ).”).
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125

such force.” PTAB trials fall into a large class of administrative
proceedings—apparently common in the U.S. administrative state—
that might be considered “similar to [classic] formal adjudication” but
are not technically “formal” in the standard APA sense because they
feature administrative judges that are not ALJs, the type of
adjudicator that the APA’s provisions on formal adjudication
specifically authorize to preside over “the taking of evidence” in lieu
of “the agency” or “one or more members of the body which
126
comprises the agency.” Generally speaking, non-ALJ administrative
judges are less insulated from an administrative agency’s more
characteristic political appointees: they are subject to performance
review by the agency, rather than the U.S. Government’s separate
Office of Personnel Management, which may support agency action
127
against an ALJ only when “good cause exists for doing so.”
Consistent with this relative lack of insulation, non-ALJ agency
adjudicators such as the PTAB’s APJs generally “lack the statutory
protection from removal, professional discipline, and performance
128
reviews that ALJs have under the APA”; are generally not subject
to the APA’s prohibition of ex parte communications “with agency
129
officials during and about their hearings”; are more likely to invite
due process challenges to the fairness and impartiality of their
130
proceedings; and are less likely to issue opinions deemed worthy of
131
Chevron deference.
Nonetheless, even if one assumes the PTAB’s APJs are
acceptable substitutes for ALJs for purposes of “foster[ing] fairness
and deliberation,” there would remain the concern that procedures
relating to PTAB trials deviate from APA-contemplated formal
132
adjudication in another significant way. As already noted, Congress
explicitly provides for review of PTAB decisions by the Federal

125. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001).
126. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b).
127. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 34, § 6.4.3a, at 322–23.
128. Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming
2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2658138 [https://perma.cc/GU6U-5C53].
129. Id.
130. Id. (“The most important benefit that agencies receive from using ALJs is improved
appearances of impartiality.”).
131. Id. (“[U]sing [non-ALJ administrative judges], instead of ALJs and formal
adjudication, decreases the likelihood under current doctrine that agencies will receive
deference from courts (under administrative law’s well-known Chevron doctrine) . . . .”).
132. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001).
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133

Circuit and, in contrast to the standard APA model for formal
adjudication, does not explicitly provide for review of decisions of
PTAB panels by the agency as a whole. Instead of conferring on the
PTO’s Director an independent, adjudicatory power to review PTAB
decisions, the Patent Act confers on the Director a “right to intervene
in an appeal from a decision entered by the [PTAB] in a derivation
proceeding under section 135 or in an inter partes or post-grant review
134
under chapter 31 or 32.” By failing to provide explicitly for appeal
to the Director and instead providing for direct appeal to the Federal
Circuit, Congress arguably placed the Federal Circuit in the
authoritative position analogous to that of “the agency” under the
135
APA’s standard provisions for formal adjudication. As discussed
further in subsection II.B.4, typical PTAB panels consisting of three
out of over two hundred APJs distributed among multiple,
136
geographically dispersed offices seem a poor stand-in for “the
agency” in the terms conceived by the APA, particularly given the
APA’s explicit distinction between initial decisions by hearing officers
137
and final decisions by “the agency.”
4. Mead and the Distinction Between PTAB Interpretation and
Authoritative PTO Interpretation. Subsection II.B.3 has highlighted
how the nature and place of relevant PTAB proceedings within the
patent regime make statutory provisions on PTAB proceedings a
shaky basis for inferring that Congress intended such proceedings to
provide an avenue for dramatic expansion of the PTO’s interpretive
authority. Suppose, however, that the PTO is conceded to have
Chevron-level authority over a relevant question of statutory
interpretation. Under Mead, there would remain the question
whether the PTO exercised that authority through PTAB

133. See supra note 117.
134. 35 U.S.C. § 143 (2012).
135. Cf. Sapna Kumar, The Accidental Agency?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 229, 278 (2013) (“[I]n
creating a specialized court with a mandate of uniformity, Congress inadvertently created an
agency-like entity in the judiciary.”).
136. See PTAB UPDATE (Aug. 2015), supra note 57, at 35 (showing 183 judges, including
“teleworking” judges, as associated with the PTO’s office in Alexandria, Virginia; 20 as
associated with the PTO’s office in Silicon Valley; 12 as associated with the PTO’s office in
Dallas, Texas; and 10 as associated with each of the PTO’s offices in Denver, Colorado, and
Detroit, Michigan).
137. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (calling for “an initial decision” by the presiding hearing
officer “[w]hen the agency did not preside at the reception of the evidence”), with id. (providing
for appeal of “an initial decision” to “the agency”).
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138

proceedings. Mead itself provides reason to believe that PTAB
panels are not proper vehicles for the exercise of such authority.
In Mead, the Supreme Court found that a Customs Service
classification ruling did not qualify as an exercise of the agency’s
139
conceded interpretive authority even though such a ruling might
140
have “precedential value” for “later transactions.” In support of this
conclusion, the Court pointed to facts that (1) Congress had provided
“for independent review of Customs classifications by the [Court of
International Trade];” (2) “Customs does not generally engage in
notice-and-comment practice when issuing them, and their treatment
by the agency makes it clear that a letter’s binding character as a
ruling stops short of third parties;” and perhaps most decisively,
(3) “46 different Customs offices issue 10,000 to 15,000 of [such
141
rulings] each year.” To the Court, these facts were telling even
though (a) Customs regulations provided that “[a] ruling letter
represents the official position of the Customs Service with respect to
the particular transaction or issue described therein;” (b) the
particular ruling letter at issue came from the Customs Headquarters
142
143
Office, rather than one of “the 46 port-of-entry Customs offices;”
and (c) “the Solicitor General of the United States ha[d] filed a brief,
cosigned by the General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury,
that represents the position set forth in the ruling letter to be the
144
official position of the Customs Service.” In the Court’s view, “[a]ny
suggestion that rulings intended to have the force of law are being
churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year at an agency’s 46 scattered
145
offices is simply self-refuting.”
Even if the PTO as a whole had relevant interpretive authority,
PTO decisions in the form of a final disposition by a PTAB panel
would seem, generally speaking, to have no greater claim to Chevron
deference than the Headquarters ruling at issue in Mead. As in Mead,
138. See supra text accompanying note 91.
139. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 232 (2001) (“[I]t is true that the general
rulemaking power conferred on Customs authorizes some regulation with the force of law . . . .”
(citations omitted)).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 232–33.
142. Id. at 222, 233–34 (observing that “the relevant statutes” provided “no indication that a
more potent delegation might have been understood as going to Headquarters even when
Headquarters provides developed reasoning, as it did in this instance”).
143. Id. at 224 (footnotes omitted).
144. Id. at 258 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 233 (majority opinion).
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there are substantial reasons for concern about the ability, or perhaps
even intent, of agency heads to ensure that all individual decisions
track the official agency view. Although the total number of PTAB
rulings on the merits in inter partes, covered business method review,
and post-grant review proceedings is not quite at the level of the
classification rulings in Mead, dealing with such proceedings and
petitions for such proceedings has already become a high-volume
business, and this high-volume business is only a portion of the
higher-volume business of PTAB review of appeals from decisions by
PTO examiners that agency heads also have under their supervision.
In addition to deciding about ten thousand appeals from original
146
examinations or reexaminations each year, the Board has already
issued final dispositions in inter partes review and covered-business147
method review at a rate of at least a couple hundred per year.
Moreover, the average annual number of such dispositions is
expected to grow substantially: in the first three quarters of 2015, the
Board received 1,897 petitions for inter partes, covered business
method, or post-grant review and decided to institute over one
148
thousand such proceedings.
Other points reinforce the sense that PTAB decisions in inter
partes, covered business method, and post-grant review are unlikely
to be viewed as warranting Chevron deference. Recent developments
have given PTAB panels a geographic dispersion that might be
compared to that of the Customs offices in Mead. Although
administrative judges have historically been based mostly in the
PTO’s central office in Virginia, they often appear there only
149
virtually and now have bases in five offices dispersed across the
146. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, RECEIPTS AND DISPOSITIONS BY TECH. CTRS.:
EX PARTE APPEALS (2014), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ip/boards/bpai/stats/
receipts/fy2014-sep-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7U3-RNMQ] (recording that the PTAB disposed
of 9,880 ex parte appeals in fiscal year 2014).
147. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, AIA PROGRESS: STATISTICS (Apr. 2, 2015),
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/aia_statistics_04-02-2015.pdf [https://perma.
cc/W2YW-TNMW].
148. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
STATISTICS 5, 7 (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-0930%20PTAB.pdf [https://perma.cc/87M6-QNMT], (reporting the launch of 665 new inter partes
reviews, 80 covered business method reviews, and 2 post-grant reviews in as-yet-incomplete
fiscal year 2015).
149. See MICHAEL ASTORINO, MATT CLEMENTS, BART A. GERSTENBLITH & MEREDITH
PETRAVICK, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DAY IN THE LIFE OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE
PATENT JUDGE 2, http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/a_day_in_the_life_of_an_
apj.pdf [https://perma.cc/JPC7-SWUT] (noting, in remarks of Administrative Patent Judge
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United States. Moreover, the PTAB lacks independent authority to
give its decisions precedential effect even within the PTO, and few
decisions by the PTAB or the BPAI have been given such effect.
According to a PTAB rule of standard operating procedure, PTAB
opinions are only flagged as precedential if (1) “a majority of the
Board’s voting members agree that the opinion should be made
151
152
precedential;” and (2) the PTO “Director concurs.” Whereas the
PTAB and the BPAI have commonly issued thousands of decisions
each year, the PTO currently lists only twenty-six precedential
opinions of either Board that are currently in force, with the earliest
153
of these opinions having been issued in late-1994. Nonprecedential
PTAB opinions seem particularly unlikely to trigger Chevron
deference from Article III courts, whose judges might wonder why
they should consider themselves largely bound by a PTAB ruling that
neither the PTAB nor the agency more generally considers to be
binding. Subsection II.B.6 addresses in detail the special case of
precedential opinions.
5. Comparison to Mead’s Examples of Chevron-Warranting
Adjudication. Arguments for the general provision of Chevron
deference to PTAB rulings on the interpretation of substantive
Clements, that “the USPTO’s excellent telework options” and general allowance for judges to
“appear by videoconference in a Hearing Room in Alexandria[, Virginia]”).
150. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE
QUARTERLY MEETING: PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD UPDATE 33 (Aug. 14, 2014),
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/about/advisory/ppac/20140814_PPAC_PTABUpdate.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2J88-BHTU] (showing office demographics); Texas Regional Office, U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/about-us/uspto-locations/dallas-texas
[https://perma.cc/4A3B-DPVK] (“The goal is to have 100 examiners and 20 administrative
patent judges, as well as several support staff, on site in Dallas by the end of the first year of
operation.”).
151. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 2 (REV.
9): PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS AND DESIGNATION OF OPINIONS AS PRECEDENTIAL,
INFORMATIVE, REPRESENTATIVE, AND ROUTINE 3–4 (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/sop2-revision-9-dated-9-22-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/66TR-7M
HQ] [hereinafter USPTO SOP 2] (indicating that “informative,” “representative,” and
“routine” opinions are “not binding authority” except as “law of the case”).
152. Id. (“No opinion may be precedential without concurrency by the Director.”).
153. Precedential Opinions, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Oct. 6, 2014), http://
www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/decisions
[https://
perma.cc/DU6V-HBD9]; see also USPTO SOP 2, supra note 151, at 3 (“An opinion is not
precedential simply because it has been published in a commercial reporter, involves an
expanded panel, or includes an ex officio member on the panel.”); see generally id. at 2
(indicating that “informative,” “representative,” and “routine” opinions are “not binding
authority” except as “law of the case”).
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provisions of the Patent Act do not appear greatly helped by
comparison to the eight cases that a footnote in Mead specifically
cites as examples of “adjudication cases” in which Chevron deference
154
was warranted. Seven of these eight cases involved review of
decisions made by a body looking like “the agency” in the APA’s
terms—that is, a body consisting of a small number of presidentially
appointed heads of an independent agency: the three heads of the
155
Federal Labor Relations Authority, the five heads of the National
156
Labor Relations Board, and the five heads of the now defunct
157
Interstate Commerce Commission. Thus, from the start, citation of
these seven cases provides little support for extending Chevron
deference to the decisions of panels of a large-numbered body of
lower-level officials like the APJs of the PTAB.
For purposes of comparison to the PTAB, Mead’s eighth
example is more intriguing. The case in question involved an
administrative adjudication by the Board of Immigration Appeals
158
(BIA). Like PTAB members, BIA members are members of a
multi-person adjudicatory body appointed not by the President but,
instead, by the head of the relevant government department—in the

154. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 n.12 (2001) (listing eight “adjudication
cases” in which Chevron deference applied).
155. See Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps., Local 1309 v. Dep’t of Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 90–91
(1999) (reviewing a circuit court’s decision to “set aside” an order of the Federal Labor
Relations Authority); Fort Stewart Schs. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 495 U.S. 641, 644
(1990) (reviewing circuit decision that “upheld the Authority’s decision”); Dep’t of Treasury v.
Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 494 U.S. 922, 924 (1990) (“review[ing a] determination of the
Federal Labor Relations Authority”).
156. See Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 396 (1996) (reviewing a circuit decision
to enforce an order from the National Labor Relations Board); ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB,
510 U.S. 317, 320–21 (1994) (reviewing a circuit decision to enforce an order from the National
Labor Relations Board that had followed a hearing before an administrative law judge).
157. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 414 (1992)
(reviewing circuit decision on final order from Interstate Commerce Commission); Norfolk &
W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers’ Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 128 (1991) (responding to separate
orders from the Interstate Commerce Commission); see generally Marshall J. Breger & Gary J.
Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52
ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1260–62, 1273–75 (2000) (providing information on the Federal Labor
Relations Authority and National Labor Relations Board as part of a descriptive list of
independent agencies); Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies
(and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 776 (2013) (noting that the Interstate
Commerce Commission had “[f]ive commissioners, appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate”).
158. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (explaining that the Attorney
General’s delegation of authority to the BIA provides a basis for Chevron deference to the
BIA’s interpretations of the INA).
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159

BIA’s case, the Attorney General; in the PTAB’s case, the
160
Secretary of Commerce.
Nonetheless, the BIA differs from the PTAB in a number of
ways that appear relevant under Mead. First, the BIA apparently has
generally been, and remains, a significantly more exclusive and elite
body than the PTAB. As opposed to the hundreds of members of the
PTAB, permanent membership of the BIA has, since at least the
early 1980s, been capped at a number ranging from five to twenty161
162
three, with the current cap standing at seventeen. The BIA’s
permanent membership may be supplemented by additional
163
temporary members, but the current number of such temporary
164
members stands at the relatively small number of four.
A second way that the BIA differs from the PTAB is that the
BIA can generally claim Chevron-level authority as a derivative of
the Attorney General’s separately recognized Chevron-level
authority. The Supreme Court has indicated that the Attorney
General “clear[ly]” enjoys a general grant of Chevron-level
165
authority, and the Court has accorded the BIA derivative Chevron-

159. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2015) (“The Board members shall be attorneys appointed by
the Attorney General . . . .”).
160. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012) (specifying that APJs “are appointed by the Secretary, in
consultation with the Director”).
161. DAVID A. MARTIN, THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, HIROSHI MOTOMURA &
MARYELLEN FULLERTON, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 281 (6th
ed. 2008) (discussing variation in the number of permanent BIA members); AM. BAR ASS’N,
REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 3–5 (2010) (“Since [1983], the number of BIA
members has varied from as few as five to as many as 23.”).
162. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (“The Board shall consist of 17 members.”).
163. The Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) has the power to
appoint temporary BIA members for up to six-month terms. Id. § 1003.1(a)(3). Temporary BIA
members have the same adjudicatory authority as permanent members, “except that temporary
Board members [lack] the authority to vote on any matter decided by the Board en banc.” Id.
164. In December 2015, the Department of Justice’s website indicated that, at that time, the
BIA had fourteen permanent members and four temporary members. Board of Immigration
Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-ofimmigration-appeals-bios#Temporary_Board_Members [https://perma.cc/FQ7D-RAJJ].
165. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999) (noting statutory language saying
that “the ‘determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law
shall be controlling[,]’” and adding “that judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially
appropriate in the immigration context” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (1994)); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (“[D]etermination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all
questions of [immigration] law shall be controlling.”); 1 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY
MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3.03[1] (2008)
(noting that “the Attorney General’s determination on all questions of [immigration] law is
controlling”).
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level authority in accordance with explicit regulatory language
providing that, in deciding cases, BIA members “exercise the
‘discretion and authority conferred upon the Attorney General by
166
law.’” Consistent with this delegation of authority, BIA members
can vote to accord precedential status to decisions “by a threemember panel or by the Board en banc” without requiring further
167
action by the Attorney General. In contrast, the PTO and PTO
Director currently lack a general grant of PTAB-independent
Chevron-level authority in interpreting substantive provisions of the
168
Patent Act. Moreover, neither the Patent Act nor PTO regulations
169
accord PTAB members alter ego status with respect to the Director.
Further, as noted above, the PTAB currently lacks the ability to make
170
its decisions precedential without the Director’s approval. In short,
the PTO has no relevant, separately derived authority on which the
PTAB can be parasitic, and, in any event, the PTAB presents a
weaker case than the BIA for parasitically derived authority.
6. The Potentially Special Case of Precedential PTAB
Interpretations. Elsewhere in this issue, Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai
suggest that a strong case for such deference might arise for a
determination resulting from a PTO rehearing involving a PTAB
171
panel stacked by the Director to ensure a particular result. But
given Mead’s emphasis on “relatively formal administrative
procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should
172
underlie a pronouncement of [legal] force,”
such irregular
166. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1) (1998)). The present
analog of this regulation provides that BIA members are “to act as the Attorney General’s
delegates in the cases that come before them.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1). Such delegation has
apparently been authorized by statute. GORDON ET AL., supra note 165, § 3.03[2] (“As
contemplated by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Attorney General has
delegated to various officers his responsibilities under the immigration laws.” (footnote
omitted)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) (“The Attorney General shall establish such
regulations, . . . delegate such authority, and perform such other acts as the Attorney General
determines to be necessary for carrying out this section.”).
167. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g).
168. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
169. See 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2012) (describing the PTAB); cf. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1535
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (reaffirming that the PTAB’s predecessor, the BPAI, “is not the alter
ego or agent of” the head of the PTO); Duffy, supra note 33, at 908 (observing that BPAI
members “are not mere ‘alter ego[s] or agent[s]’ of the PTO Director”).
170. See supra text accompanying note 152.
171. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era of Patent
Stare Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1595 (2016).
172. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001).
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proceedings and their extraordinary possibility seem a less than
persuasive basis for Chevron deference. As noted earlier, although
the Federal Circuit has previously found such proceedings to be
authorized by the Patent Act, the Federal Circuit declined to address
whether they violated the constitutional requirement of due
173
process.
Ultimately, the best case for PTAB decisions warranting
Chevron deference seems to lie with PTAB decisions designated as
having precedential status. Some obstacles to Chevron deference for
interpretations of substantive provisions of the Patent Act are
overcome if one focuses solely on these decisions. Given that (1)
precedential status means that the PTO views the relevant decision as
binding and (2) the Director must approve such status, a precedential
opinion seems more likely than a nonprecedential opinion to merit
174
treatment as a true decision of “the agency” in APA terms.
Nonetheless, because there is no statutory basis for the PTAB’s
procedure for designating opinions as precedential, a court might
view as impermissible bootstrapping a proposition that a requirement
for Director review developed by the PTO transforms an otherwise
non-Chevron-deference meriting PTAB opinion into one that merits
175
Chevron deference.
The Supreme Court’s reference to delegation by regulation in
the course of according Chevron deference to the BIA provides little
aid here because, with respect to the BIA, the question was
essentially the distinct one of whether the Attorney General’s
176
recognized interpretive authority flows down to the BIA. In the
context of the PTAB, the challenge is to show that otherwise
nonexistent interpretive authority arises from congressional provision
173. See supra text accompanying note 35.
174. See supra text accompanying note 119; cf. Hickman, supra note 91, at 552 (observing
that, “although the [Supreme] Court has made clear that decisions of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) carry the force of law and are Chevron-eligible,” a number of courts of appeals
have held that “interpretations designated by the BIA as nonprecedential” do not merit
Chevron deference and others “have reserved the question”).
175. Bressman, supra note 91, at 1469 (“Mead makes clear that agencies cannot shoehorn
themselves into Chevron deference by voluntarily adopting procedures that Congress has not
authorized.”); cf. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
1004 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that, under Mead, “the existence of a formal
rulemaking proceeding is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for according Chevron
deference,” with the lack of sufficiency resulting “because Congress may have intended not to
leave the matter of a particular [statutory] interpretation up to the agency, irrespective of the
procedure the agency uses”).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 158–66.

GOLDEN IN PRINTER FINAL (UPDATED PAGE NUMBERS) (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

WORKING WITHOUT CHEVRON

4/21/2016 3:38 PM

1691

for the PTAB and associated post-grant proceedings. The fact that
the Supreme Court has accepted the ability of the Attorney General
to delegate recognized Chevron-level authority to the BIA does not
imply that the PTO can effectively generate Chevron-level
interpretive authority by adopting one or more procedures involving
both the PTAB and the Director. Without relevant congressional
provision, the PTO’s generation of such procedure seems to offer
little in the nature of evidence of a congressional intent to delegate
Chevron-level interpretive authority.
Moreover, even if the PTO’s current procedure for designating a
PTAB opinion as precedential were a creature of Congress, it would
arguably fall short under Mead because of how that procedure
compares negatively to standard procedures for agency-level review
in formal adjudication. Although a party to a PTAB adjudication may
“request in writing that an opinion be made precedential,” the PTO
does not appear to have issued rules in relation to such a request that
provide for basics of agency-level review as contemplated by the
177
APA —namely, that parties have “a reasonable opportunity to
submit for the [agency’s] consideration . . . (1) proposed findings and
conclusions; or (2) exceptions to the decisions or recommended
decisions of subordinate employees or to tentative agency decisions;
and (3) supporting reasons for the exceptions or proposed findings or
178
conclusions;” and that the agency generate a record “show[ing] the
179
ruling on each finding, conclusion, or exception presented.” Thus,
the PTO’s current approach to according precedential status might
fail Mead-informed expectations for a “procedure tending to foster
the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement”
180
that presumptively binds Article III courts.
III. PTO AS “PRIME MOVER”
Part II argues that the PTO’s powers remain significantly limited,
particularly with respect to its ability to bind courts to an agency
interpretation of substantive provisions of the Patent Act. This Part
contends that, despite such constraints, the PTO can still accomplish
much through adjudicatory processes as patent law’s probable “prime
mover”—the government body that is likely to be the first to address
177.
178.
179.
180.

USPTO SOP 2, supra note 151, at 2–3.
5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (2012).
Id.
United States v. Mead Corp, 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001).
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many patent law issues in a centralized and systematic fashion.
Further, although ostensibly back-end processes, the post-issuance
proceedings administered by the PTAB indeed do much to enhance
the PTO’s prime-mover potential.
First, even without an entitlement to Chevron deference, PTAB
decisions may be accorded persuasive weight. Indeed, although
PTAB post-issuance proceedings are not formal adjudication in the
manner explicitly contemplated by the APA, their relatively formal
nature compared to earlier PTO proceedings suggests that,
particularly when precedential, PTAB decisions in post-issuance
proceedings are likely to have a greater claim to substantial Skidmore
deference than was previously available to the PTO through
adjudication. Although some have wondered about the substantiality
181
of Skidmore deference, a relatively recent empirical study has led
Kristin Hickman and Matthew Krueger to conclude that Skidmore
review is in fact frequently “highly deferential,” with results
182
“weighted heavily in favor of government agencies.”
Of course, as an alternative to applying Skidmore, courts might
determine more simply that, quite generally, they owe no deference
to PTAB rulings on questions of substantive patent law. In 2015, the
Supreme Court apparently took such a tack in reviewing the Internal
Revenue Service’s (IRS) views on the availability of certain tax
183
credits under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. But
the Court’s apparent failure to accord any deference in that case
reflected special circumstances: the vast significance for national
184
health insurance policy of the interpretive question and the Court’s
belief that the IRS had “no expertise in crafting health insurance
185
policy of this sort.” The PTO is unlikely to be deemed to have “no
expertise” in substantive patent law, and PTAB rulings on questions
of substantive patent law will, presumably, be perceived only rarely—
if ever—as having a policy significance on a par with a tax-credit
181. Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power, supra note 7, at 549 (“[S]ome have suggested that
Skidmore deference itself is, in reality, a regime of zero deference . . . .”).
182. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1280 (2007).
183. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015) (discussing how “[t]he IRS addressed the
availability of tax credits by promulgating a rule”).
184. Id. at 2489 (describing the availability of tax credits “on Federal Exchanges” as “a
question of deep ‘economic and political significance’” that Congress “surely would have
[delegated to the IRS] expressly” if it had intended such a delegation at all (quoting FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000))).
185. Id.
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question whose resolution threatened to hurl state insurance markets
186
into “death spirals.” Thus, the Skidmore framework appears to offer
a plausible mechanism for the PTO to use its new post-issuance
proceedings to obtain meaningfully enhanced deference on questions
of substantive patent law, particularly for those rulings designated as
187
precedential.
A second way that PTAB proceedings can enable the PTO to
flex its added muscle is by providing a forum for developing agency
interpretations of PTO regulations. The Federal Circuit has recently
emphasized the high level of deference that it gives PTAB
interpretations of PTO regulations, saying that the court accepts such
an interpretation unless it is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
188
the regulation.” Given restrictions of the PTO’s ability to issue rules
having the force of law, relevant regulations are likely to be
substantially procedural, but the bounds and meaningfulness of
distinctions between procedure and substance are not always clear.
For example, the Federal Circuit applied the aforementioned high
level of deference to uphold a PTAB interpretation that placed on a
patent owner the burden of showing that new claims proposed in inter
189
partes review “are patentable over the prior art of record.” By
reversing the normal state of affairs in the PTO, under which claims
are in essence presumed valid unless the PTO or another party
190
provides reason to believe otherwise, the PTAB thereby effectively
191
ratcheted up the bite of substantive patentability requirements. The
186. Id. at 2492–93 (eschewing a statutory interpretation that, in the Court’s view, would
“likely create the very ‘death spirals’ [in state insurance markets] that Congress designed the
[PPACA] to avoid”).
187. See United States v. Mead Corp, 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (observing that “agencies
charged with applying a statute necessarily make all sorts of interpretive choices, and while not
all of those choices bind the judges to follow them, they certainly may influence courts facing
questions the agencies have already answered”). But see Peter L. Strauss, In Search of
Skidmore, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 789, 792 (2014) (questioning the current Supreme Court’s
commitment to the Skidmore deference framework in light of a case in which “there is not a
mention of the concept—indeed, its relevance is effectively denied—in opinions signed by eight
of the Justices”).
188. Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re
Sullivan, 362 F.3d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
189. Id. at 1307.
190. See, e.g., Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“In the prosecution of a
patent, the initial burden falls on the PTO to set forth the basis for any rejection, i.e., a prima
facie case.”).
191. Such substantive effect has caused the Supreme Court elsewhere to hold that the
assignment of burdens of proof is substantive, rather than merely procedural. Medtronic, Inc. v.
Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 849 (2014) (“[W]e have held that ‘the burden of
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PTAB might more generally use its adjudicatory powers to interpret
PTO regulations in ways that have a substantial impact on patent law
practice and outcomes. Even more generally, the PTO possesses the
ability to influence the course of patent law through its fundamental
position as patent law’s “prime mover”—the first and, often, most
readily accessed gatekeeper for whether a patent claim should be
allowed or should continue in force.
True, the sheer volume of patent applications and issued patents
generates practical limitations on the influence that the PTO can
exert through first-stage review. Even with several thousand
examiners, the yearly influx of several hundred thousand applications
192
means that the PTO can—and even arguably should —often conduct
little more than a relatively cursory investigation of various questions
193
relating to patentability. Further, the need to use several thousand
examiners, as well as hundreds of administrative patent judges, means
that the PTO has natural problems ensuring that individual decisions
by agency employees are properly representative of the official
positions of the agency as a whole.
Nonetheless, in part through the issuance of guidance documents
that do not have the force of law, the PTO has already shown a
capacity to influence the substantive course of patent law’s
development. The utility guidelines that the PTO developed in the
late 1990s to deal with a flood of patent applications for fragmentary
194
DNA sequences were deployed by the PTO’s examination corps
and the BPAI to reject specific patent claims in original
195
examination. The Federal Circuit later affirmed these rejections
proof’ is a ‘substantive aspect of a claim.’” (quoting Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S.
15, 20–21 (2000))).
192. Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
1495, 1497 (2001) (“Because so few patents are ever asserted against a competitor, it is much
cheaper for society to make detailed validity determinations in those few cases than to invest
additional resources examining patents that will never be heard from again.”).
193. See Golden, Proliferating Patents, supra note 61, at 496–97 (indicating how, roughly
speaking, an average of something in the nature of twenty hours for PTO examiner work on
each application follows from current numbers of patent examiners and incoming applications
per year).
194. Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power, supra note 7, at 554 (discussing how “the USPTO
injected new life into the utility requirement for biological-substance and chemical-substance
inventions”).
195. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that, in reviewing a patent
application, the PTO examiner had “found that claimed [DNA sequences] were not supported
by a specific and substantial utility” and that the Board had also found that various asserted
utilities for the sequences were not specific and substantial utilities).
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under a deferential standard of review that reflected the factual
196
underpinnings for the PTO’s approach.
Likewise, even before the AIA, the PTO has shown a capacity to
use its adjudicatory processes to tee up important legal issues for
courts and even to suggest novel ways in which the courts might
ultimately resolve those issues. An example comes in the form of
opinions associated with a 2005 precedential decision by the BPAI in
197
Ex parte Lundgren. In that case, the Board addressed questions of
198
subject-matter eligibility, previously a relatively dormant area of the
199
law on patentability. More specifically, the opinion for the majority
of the Board rejected a “technological arts” requirement for subject200
matter eligibility but declined to reject or criticize an alternative
approach to limiting patentable subject matter suggested in a
201
dissent. This dissent not only highlighted the PTO’s natural need to
202
address such issues promptly but also proposed an alternative test
for subject-matter eligibility under which a process claim must be
“tied to a particular machine or apparatus” or “transform physical
203
subject matter to a different state or thing.” The BPAI opinions’
suggestion of the possibility of reconsidering questions of patentable
subject matter preceded the Supreme Court’s spur to that effect,

196. Id. at 1379 (“We conclude that substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings that
each of the five claimed [DNA sequences] lacks[]a specific and substantial utility and that they
are not enabled.”).
197. Ex parte Lundgren, No. 2003-2088, 2004 WL 3561262 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 20, 2004).
198. Id. at *4 (“We reverse the examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (non-statutory
subject matter).”).
199. See Golden, Prime Percolator, supra note 12, at 683 (observing that “broad challenges
to patentability to whole classes of subject matter” might, “[u]ntil recently,” have been classified
as arguments “that parties appearing in patent cases [would] be systematically unlikely to
make”).
200. Lundgren, 2004 WL 3561262, at *5 (“Our determination is that there is currently no
judicially recognized separate ‘technological arts’ test to determine patent eligible subject
matter under § 101.”).
201. Id. (“We decline at this stage . . . to enter a new ground of rejection based on Judge
Barrett’s rationale, because in our view his proposed rejection would involve development of
the factual record and, thus, we take no position in regard to the proposed new ground of
rejection.”).
202. Id. at *12 (Barrett, Admin. Patent J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In
recent years, the USPTO has been flooded with claims to ‘processes,’ many of which bear scant
resemblance to classical processes of manipulating or transforming compositions of matter and
of functions performed by machines.”).
203. Id. at *26 (“A series of steps which is not tied to a particular machine or apparatus, and
which does not transform physical subject matter to a different state or thing, does not meet the
statutory definition of a ‘process’ and is not patentable subject matter.”).
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through a grant of certiorari in Laboratory Corp. of America
204
Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., and a later dissent from
dismissal of that case as one in which certiorari was improvidently
205
The Federal Circuit later substantially adopted this
granted.
206
“machine or transformation” test. Although the Supreme Court
ultimately rejected the test as lacking sufficient statutory and
207
precedential support as well as, in the opinion of at least four
208
Justices, possessing excessive rigidity, the Supreme Court has left in
place and bolstered the turn toward a more restrictive approach to
subject-matter eligibility that the Boards’ judges had signaled was
209
possible.
The PTO’s newly expanded power to engage in post-issuance
proceedings increases its capacity to act as a “prime mover.” PTAB
appeals and trials give private parties many opportunities to highlight
issues that the PTO might address as a matter of first impression or,
at least, before any presumptively conclusive, centralized
determination by the Federal Circuit or Supreme Court. Provisions
for automatic stays of district court litigation while a patent is subject
to inter partes or post-grant review effectively provide the PTO with a
210
variant of “primary jurisdiction” when a challenger to a patent files
204. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 546 U.S. 975 (2005) (granting
certiorari).
205. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006) (per
curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning Federal Circuit precedent on subject-matter
eligibility); see also Golden, Prime Percolator, supra note 12, at 707 (“It seems no coincidence
that, in the wake of Laboratory Corp., Federal Circuit panels experimented with more vigorous
enforcement of requirements for subject matter eligibility . . . .”).
206. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 600 (2010) (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (en banc)) (noting the Federal Circuit’s adoption of a “machine-or-transformation
test” for the patent eligibility of a process).
207. Id. at 602–04 (discussing statutory language, interpretive principles, and prior Supreme
Court decisions).
208. Id. at 606 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (“Section 101’s terms suggest that new technologies
may call for new inquiries.”).
209. See id. at 612 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion) (emphasizing that, in rejecting a machineor-transformation test lately adopted by the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court should not be
“read as endorsing [prior] interpretations of § 101” by the Federal Circuit); id. at 658–59
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (contending that rejection of the Federal Circuit’s prior
“useful, concrete, and tangible result” test for subject-matter eligibility was “consistent with” all
the Justices’ written opinions (quoting State St. Bank & Tr. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998))); see also id. at 614 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)
(stating that “it would be a grave mistake to assume that anything with a ‘useful, concrete and
tangible result’ . . . may be patented” (quoting State St. Bank & Tr., 149 F.3d at 1373)).
210. See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 34, at 221 (describing primary jurisdiction as “a concept
used by courts to allocate initial decision making responsibility” and noting that, “[i]f a court
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a civil action in district court after or on the same day as the
211
challenger petitions for inter partes or post-grant review.
More generally, inter partes and post-grant review proceedings
not only provide expanded opportunities for PTO action but also
mean that such action will come in circumstances in which PTO
review, in terms of timing and quality, is more on a par with the sort
of trial-based, post-issuance review traditionally only available in
Article III courts or, for at least a subset of infringement cases, the
212
International Trade Commission. As opposed to prior provisions
for ex parte reexamination and inter partes reexamination that limited
grounds for post-issuance challenge to arguments of obviousness or
213
lack of novelty based on prior-art “patents or printed publications,”
the new provisions for post-grant review broadly enable the PTO to
review challenges to patent claims based on all the grounds for
invalidity that an accused infringer might raise in litigation in the
214
district courts. Moreover, these new provisions enable the PTO to

concludes that an issue raised in an action before the court is within the primary jurisdiction of
an agency, the court will defer any decision in the action before it until the agency has addressed
the issue” (emphasis omitted)); John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim
Interpretation: Administrative Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 109, 137 (2000) (observing
that, after a court “decides to invoke the doctrine” of primary jurisdiction, the court may
“grant[] a stay of proceedings”).
211. 35 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2012) (“If the petitioner or real party in interest files a civil action
challenging the validity of a claim of the patent on or after the date on which the petitioner files
a petition for inter partes review of the patent, that civil action shall be automatically stayed
. . . .”); id. § 325(a)(2) (“If the petitioner or real party in interest files a civil action challenging
the validity of a claim of the patent on or after the date on which the petitioner files a petition
for post-grant review of the patent, that civil action shall be automatically stayed . . . .”).
212. Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 6 (discussing procedural aspects of post-grant review, inter
partes review, and covered business method review proceedings); Melissa F. Wasserman,
Deference Asymmetries: Distortions in the Evolution of Regulatory Law, 93 TEX. L. REV. 625,
661 (2015); Wasserman, supra note 85, at 1981 (noting that the PTO must “allow oral arguments
and discovery as part of [its] postgrant review proceedings”); cf. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 89,
at 327–28 (2007) (observing that “various post-grant review proceedings . . . proposed [in the
bills that ultimately culminated in amendment of the U.S. Patent Act] would be trial-type
procedures on the record that bear the hallmarks of formal adjudication—most notably, a
proceeding before an administrative judge at which the parties present evidence and crossexamination, with the judge’s decision based on the record”).
213. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–03 (indicating allowed grounds from launching an ex parte
reexamination); id. § 311(a) (pre-AIA provision applying to inter partes reexamination requests
filed before September 16, 2012) (indicating allowed grounds for an inter partes reexamination).
214. See id. § 321(b) (“A petitioner in a post-grant review may request to cancel as
unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent on any ground that could be raised under paragraph
(2) or (3) of section 282(b) (relating to invalidity of the patent or any claim).”); cf. AIA § 18(a)
(providing for grounds for transitional covered business method patent review that largely track
those for post-grant review).
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institute post-grant review not only (1) on grounds that a challenge to
215
one or more claims would “more likely than not” succeed, but also
and alternatively (2) on grounds “that the petition [for post-grant
review] raises a novel or unsettled legal question that is important to
216
other patents or patent applications.” At the same time, the PTO
retains the capacity to launch post-issuance proceedings sua sponte
217
on the more limited grounds allowed for ex parte reexamination.
In sum, the PTO’s new post-issuance proceedings allow it to
compete more substantially with Article III courts’ review of
questions of patentability. They raise the possibility that court
proceedings on such questions should be seen as more supplementary
than complementary, thereby helping to call into question the need
for as heavy-handed a judicial role as patent law has made traditional.
CONCLUSION
This Article has noted how developments in patent law have
strengthened the PTO’s hand while also appearing to leave its
interpretive authority substantially constrained. In particular, Part II
has argued that the PTO remains generally blocked from obtaining
high-level Chevron deference for its interpretations of substantive
provisions of the Patent Act, even when the PTO arrives at those
interpretations through relatively formal PTAB proceedings.
But as argued previously in an article that focused on
rulemaking, rather than adjudication, concern with entitlement to
218
Chevron deference can be overblown. Regardless of whether the
PTO obtains Chevron-level deference for its interpretations of
substantive provisions of the U.S. Patent Act, its general status as the
first mover on questions of patentability and its expanded set of postissuance proceedings put the agency in prime position to have a
significant impact on how patent law develops. Just as the PTO can
influence the courts’ ultimately authoritative interpretations of the
215. 35 U.S.C. § 324(a).
216. Id. § 324(b).
217. Id. § 303(a) (empowering the Director, “[o]n his own initiative, and any time . . . [to]
determine whether a substantial new question of patentability is raised by patents and
publications”); id. § 304 (providing that a determination by the Director of “a substantial new
question of patentability” in relation to patents and printed publications “will include an order
for reexamination”).
218. Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power, supra note 7, at 558 (“The USPTO’s experience with
utility and written-description guidelines shows that the USPTO can successfully use
nonbinding rulemaking to provide a systematic response to certain patentability problems.”).
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law through persuasively supported interpretive rules, the agency
can also influence those interpretations through persuasively
supported PTAB opinions or through PTAB opinions that at the very
least help to crystallize available adjudicatory options or otherwise
catalyze deliberation in Article III courts. The BPAI judges’ opinions
in Ex parte Lundgren illustrate how the PTO can help stir the
adjudicatory pot in a way that encourages further legal
220
developments. The extent to which the PTO exploits its strategic
position wisely will likely play a significant role in the extent to which
the U.S. patent system succeeds in its constitutional purpose to
221
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”

219. Id. at 553 (“There are already notable instances of situations in which the USPTO’s
adoption of a policy, guideline, or practice on a controversial question of substantive patent law
has ‘succeeded’ in the sense that courts . . . have upheld or embraced the USPTO’s position as a
correct interpretation of statutory law.”).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 197–203. Given (1) the PTO’s presumably better
factfinding capacities in its more trial-like post-issuance proceedings and (2) the Supreme
Court’s recent highlighting of the Federal Circuit’s duty commonly to defer to other entities’
original factual findings, see Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015)
(“We hold that the appellate court must apply a ‘clear error,’ not a de novo, standard of review
[to trial judge factfinding in relation to questions of patent claim construction].”), there is reason
to hope that the PTO is well positioned to obtain substantial deference for even relatively
general conclusions relating to the patentability of certain types of subject matter, as long as
those opinions have a substantial grounding in factual findings. But cf. Benjamin & Rai, supra
note 89, at 290 (contending that the Federal Circuit’s “[h]ighly aggressive application of [a
substantial evidence] standard [of review] to the PTO’s informal proceedings—where the only
formal evidence on which the PTO can rely to make the case against patentability is written
prior art—yields the paradoxical result of rigorous review”).
221. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

